ABSTRACT:
In this project, we give an efficient and simple-to-implement symmetric searchable encryption scheme (SSE) for string search, which takes one round of communication, O(n) times of calculations over n documents. Not at all like previous scheme, we utilize hash-chaining rather than the chain of encryption tasks for an index generation, which makes it reasonable for lightweight applications. Not at all like the past SSE plans for string seek, with our plan, server adapts nothing about the recurrence and the relative places of the words being looked aside from what it can learn from the history. We are the first to propose probabilistic trapdoors in SSE for string seek. We provide a concrete proof of non-adoptive security of our plan against honest but curious server based on the definitions.
We have shown another idea of inquiry design protection, which gives a measure of security against the leakage from the trapdoor. We have demonstrated that our plan is secure under search pattern indistinguishability of definition. We demonstrate why SSE conspire for string search can’t attain adaptive indistinguishability. We additionally propose modifications of our plan with the goal that the plan can be utilized against active adversaries at the cost of more rounds of communications and memory space. We validate our plan against two different commercial datasets.
